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Abstract
　　The Big Four, in corporate English school history in Japan, set the standards for 
language communication as a commodity, as well as drove and dominated a market 
that annually generated billions in Japanese yen and reached hundreds of thousands 
in student-customers.  The paper addresses the historical rise, decline, and 
resiliency of this industry, from the perspectives of management, marketing, and its 
underlying consumer psychology.  The paper begins with critiques on the Japanese 
system of English education and the need for communicative training, followed 
by recent research from social, educational, and language psychology, as well as 
neuroscience, which collectively support why the need for such communication was 
desired in Japan.  The paper next explores how that desire was commodified and 
marketed, how the student became a customer, and how the role of teacher became 
a sales asset.  The focus on the Big Four schools presents a brief history of how 
two of them survived, how two failed, and how the market for private English has 
changed, from its rocketing beginning during the Japanese bubble economy of the 
1980s, through the changes and downturns that occurred up to the present.
keywords:　EFL history, eikaiwa, English conversation school, English in Japan, 
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Introduction
　　In February 2006, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry was reporting 
826,000 enrollments in private English-conversation (eikaiwa: 英 会 話) schools in Japan, 
generating a monthly sales figure for the industry of ¥17.2 billion (apx. $156 million 
U.S., based on an exchange rate of ¥110 to $1) (Matsutani, 2010).  This customer base 
represented 0.6% of the entire Japanese population, which was spending, on average, 
¥20,800 ($189) per month on what was essentially a service product.  The enrollments 
number alone was staggering, compared to the mere few-thousand taking private lessons 
just 30 years prior.  
　　The evolution of the private English-education market occurred largely by transforming 
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the learning of English itself into a profit-generating commodity, which developed alongside 
other industries, from the 1970s to the present, during Japan’s extensive economic 
development and path to global influence.  At the same time, given that English had already 
been compulsory in Japan since its post-1945 reforms, not just any type of English for 
commercial development would suffice.  A potential market was calling for one aspect that 
public education was failing to provide: English for oral communication.   The plans to 
develop such an industry also required a type of instructor, one that the same education 
system was also not providing: the native speaker, and given Japan’s economic, cultural, 
and security ties, preferably one that was young, energetic, and originating from North 
America.
　　The current paper will begin with a brief introduction to the social, linguistic, 
psychological, and recent neuroscientific research that helps explain an underlying need for 
such a market in Japan, and the human resouces it needed to explore (or exploit) in order to 
be successful.  From there, the paper will consider the history of how this market developed, 
and partially collapsed, in the hands of the Big Four English-conversation schools. These 
schools  came to dominate over 80% of the entire market, from the decade of the 1980s, 
until the Nova shock of 2007 and the bankruptcy of the Geos Corporation in 2010.  To date, 
three of these companies are in operation and remain profitable, despite downturns in the 
private language market, shifts in the national economy, and changes in national education 
policy.
Prospecting for English Communication
　　Since the Meiji Period (1868-1912), discussions regarding English language education in 
Japan have commonly been connected with debates concerning politics and the Japanese 
language.  The post-1945 period through the 1960s were no exception, ushering in changes 
that still govern language education to the present.  A critical debate from this period 
concerned whether English curriculum should be mandated in public schools.  Outspoken 
against such mandating was Shūichi Katō (1919-2008), the renowned critic, author, and 
literary scholar.  Fluent in English, French, and German, and originally a practicing medical 
doctor, Katō (1999) argued that making English a compulsory subject was counterproductive 
to the national interest, and that the proposed methods for teaching English were unsuitable 
for acquiring practical English communications skills.  The point was seconded by other 
critics of post-WWII reforms, including Yoshimi Usui (1905-1987), who argued that English 
should be defined not as some manner of technical skill, but rather as a way of developing 
communicative individuals (Shimizu, 2010).
　　With the success of Japan’s postwar recovery, the nation was re-emerging as an 
international economic and cultural force, exemplified by the arrival of the Tokyo Olympics 
in 1964 and the Osaka International Exhibition in 1970.  The course merely intensified 
debates over English education, with voices such as Katō (1999) remaining critical of the 
way that English was developing as a school subject: as a word-for-word translation task, 
and as a requirement for passing  entrance examinations.  Katō’s critique would eventually 
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have the support of classroom and scientific evidence, even if such evidence is still not acted 
upon in schools and government.  Established practices in Japan and many other nations 
have grown more insistent on extrinsically motivated convergent-learning for quantifiable 
testing (i.e., teaching correct answers for test scores).  When it comes to language 
development, such practice, at the expense of ignoring evidence and much-needed reform, 
remains more about persistent beliefs, dogmas, and institutionalisms than about learning (see 
Nakano et al., 2012, for an example of a Japanese study and perspective on English as a 
lingua franca in Asia).
　　One argument, in Japan and elsewhere, against changing the dominant tendency for 
test education in language learning, has commonly been that the primary purpose of schools 
is to develop intellectual ability.  However, despite the history of intuition and common 
biases about how people develop intellectually, a growing body of evidence from education 
and social science (see Ambrose & Sternberg, 2011; Sternberg & Kaufman, 2011) has 
indicated that excessive intellectualism, rationalism, and convergent learning practices are 
typically counterproductive to higher-level thinking, problem solving, and the ability to 
innovate, skills that are becoming more necessary in the growth of both global and domestic 
complexity.  
　　The biases also retard associative memory (relational learning), linguistic 
experimentation (expressive output), and intrinsic motivation (self-investment), all of 
which are integral to language development, both native and secondary, regardless of an 
individual learner’s intelligence, learning style, or culture (Dörnyei, 2008; Randall, 2007).  In 
terms of developing verbal communication in a second or foreign language, learners need 
to engage a certain amount of individual divergence and expressiveness, which seekers 
of communicative skills tend to do voluntarily for rather subjective, personal, and even 
emotional reasons, rather than objective, extrinsic, or intellectual ones (Dörnyei, 2003; 
Kramsch, 2010).
　　Over the past decade, the argument for a communicative style of language acquisition 
is also supported by neuroscience.  Though not all aspects of foreign language learning are 
clearly understood, one area that is well-explored is the neuroscience behind phonology, 
or the way humans hear and process linguistic information (see Biedron, 2015, for an 
overview of the neurology of foreign language aptitude).  Neuroscientists in Japan have 
also specifically studied Japanese learners of English, utilizing fMRI technology on brain 
activity regarding grammatical and auditory processing (e.g., Hashimoto & Sakai, 2003).  In 
a recent study on how native Japanese and English speakers process auditory and visual 
(AV) information, Hisanaga et al. (2016) discovered that the AV relationships, at the cortical 
levels of the brain, were noticeably different for each language.  Whereas native speakers of 
English rely more on visual cues when communicating, Japanese speakers learning English 
appear burdened by the additional visual information.  One conclusion was that instructional 
methods specializing in the sounds entering students’ ears may be more effective for 
Japanese students of English.  
　　In conjunction with the neurology of language itself, and as articulated in separate 
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neuroscientific literature, satisfying desires for certain types of brain activity tend to be 
synonymous with stimulating patterns associated with emotion, pleasure, and motivation (e.g., 
Kringelbach & Phillips, 2013).  Specifically, the behaviors of learning, motivation, and other 
seeking tendencies are tied directly into the brain’s dopamine neurotransmitter system, one 
extensively studied as being integral in the production of desire, pleasure, and addiction 
(see Panksepp, 1998, for complete study of the affective, seeking, and addictive systems in 
humans and other animals).  At a very fundamental level, it is well-documented throughout 
all the human, social, and primate sciences that people are members of a social species, and 
take automatic pleasure, in varying and personal degrees, from communicative interaction 
with other members of the species, particularly with ones who are also appealing in some 
way.
A Market for English Communication
　　The sociolinguist Takao Suzuki (1973/2001) argued that one of the most-pressing 
problems facing English education in Japan was its lack of articulated goals.  In his 
philosophy, learning any foreign language required that learners focus on at least one 
of three primary aims: (i) language as an end, (ii) language as a means, or (iii) language for 
communication.  According to the vast psychological literature on the topic, such aims, 
whether learning language or some other subject, require some form of motivation, or 
desire, to invest in the learning process (see Johnson, 2015, for a classroom case study 
of adult second-language learning, transformational motivation, and the limitations of 
instrumental language instruction).
　　From a business perspective, When treating English as a profit-generating commodity, 
the desire to learn would represent the demand side of the commonly understood supply-
and-demand dynamic that drives most markets.  In relating Suzuki’s (1973/2001) first case, (i) 
language as an end, a foreign language could also be considered a kind of attainable sensation 
or reward.  The implication is towards the study of a language for its own sake, an example 
being an individual who might wish to study English simply because of an interest in Anglo-
American language and culture.  By comparison, the second aim, (ii) language as a means, 
implies exactly that: acquiring a language skill in pursuit of some other purpose, often in 
the written form of the target language.  This would be something like purchasing a tool or 
piece of software, for the purpose of accomplishing some other task.  An example might be 
a Japanese computer scientist who needs English to keep up with global computer research, 
the majority of which is written in English.
　　The second direction, of (ii) language as a means, has become the standard by which 
educators tend to approach language development in both native and secondary language 
students.  Though useful, if employed too rigidly it tends to be stifling and counterproductive. 
In most Japanese junior and senior high schools, for instance, students typically study (or 
cram) English simply to pass high school and university entrance examinations.  What is 
commonly missing is a philosophy and curriculum fostering English as a tool for personal, 
communicative, and international or business use.
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　　To be fair, the rigid implementation, of teaching a subject as merely a means, is neither 
isolated to English nor to Japan.  Internationally, it remains the approach commonly used 
for K-12 science and mathematics, both highly convergent subjects, which face their own 
problems fostering student interest.  Science and math are typically presented as tools 
used to graduate to some other pursuit or development, rather than as pursuits that are 
rewards in themselves.  However, an intrinsically rewarding interest is what helps generate 
actual scientists and mathematicians, as well as a public that comprehends, and wishes 
to comprehend, scientific, medical, and related advances that are integral to modern 
civilization (see Lockhart, 1999, for critique of mathematics education in the United States). 
Playing the Market for Communication
　　Beyond the first two options, of English as a means or an end, Suzuki (1973/2001) 
argued for a third motivational aim, (iii) language for communication, which largely refers 
to communication for international exchange.  Suzuki stressed that Japan’s direction for 
English education should conform to this particular focus.  Not only is the option globally 
and communicatively pragmatic, it can sensitively respond and adapt to changes in Japanese 
tastes, culture, and overall needs.
　　Regarding the history behind commercial English development in Japan, the standard 
of language for communication became the profit-generating commodity that hundreds of for-
profit English conversation (eikaiwa) schools would ultimately market.  Beginning mostly in 
the 1960s, and expanding their numbers dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s, most of these 
schools were small family or single-proprietor shops that would close after just a few years 
of operation.  Four of these businesses, however, would develop into what became known 
collectively as the Big Four in eikaiwa education.
　　The Big Four is a term that covered what were the top corporate schools in Japan from 
the 1980s until 2007, the year that the largest of these, Nova Corp., filed for bankruptcy 
protection (Takahara, 2007a).  The second, third, and fourth largest of these schools, in 
order of student populations and revenue, were Geos, ECC, and Aeon.  Geos also filed for 
bankruptcy, in April 2010 (Matsutani, 2010), leaving ECC and Aeon to assume, respectively, 
the top two positions.
　　The Nova and Geos shocks were highly publicized in Japan, thus the current paper 
will only briefly mention each company here.  Geos (Global Education Opportunities and 
Services) was started in 1973, in Tokushima, Japan, under the acronym AMVIC (Ambition 
and Victory).  The focus was English language education for adults and children.  The 
cofounders were college roommates Kiyoshi Aki and Tsuneo Kusunoki.  In 1989, after 
achieving considerable success, Aki and Kusunoki decided to split AMVIC due to differences 
in business philosophies.  Retaining a more conservative objective, Aki focused on English 
learning for Japanese students, and subsequently formed the Aeon Corporation.  Kusunoki 
had larger and international ambitions, and in the midst of the Japanese asset price bubble 
(the bubble economy), formed the Geos Corporation, which quickly became one of the 
two largest eikaiwa chains nationwide.  Business remained strong for a while, yet market 
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saturation ensued in 2003 (Takahara, 2007b), followed by a 50% reduction in eikaiwa 
students between 2006 and 2010 (Matsutani, 2010).  In April of 2010, Geos collapsed.  At 
the time, its divisions were managing 7,800 employees total, about 2,100 of them full-time 
regular (Matsutani, 2010), and reporting ¥7.5 billion (apx. $65 million U.S.) in debt.
　　Prior to Geos going out of business, as well as contributing to a trend that drove Geos 
out of business, was by far the largest English school chain in history, Nova.  The first Nova 
school was cofounded by Nozomu Sahashi in August 1981, in Osaka (Nova Corporation, 
2001), making it the newest addition to what would become the Big Four.  Nova Corporation 
went public in 1996, and even through economic recession it continued to hard press its 
expansion.  Between the years 1997 and 2004, Nova expanded its branch schools from 239 
to over 600, increased annual revenues to over ¥60 billion (apx. $545 million U.S.), and 
had captured over half of the market share with more than 400,000 students (Takahara, 
2007a).  This aggressive, forward-only push also marked the beginning of the end.  In 2003, 
the English market itself had reached saturation, and the Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare began cutting grants for vocational and language learning, which meant less money 
for students and, in turn, contributed to a decline in market performance (Takahara, 2007b). 
However, such market changes and reduction in revenue made no impression on Nova’s 
management, who refused to reassess their aggressive expansion policies.  The result was 
record losses for the years 2005-2007 (Stubbings, 2007; Takahara, 2007b), coinciding with 
a sharp downward turn in eikaiwa enrollments throughout the market beginning in 2006 
(Matsutani, 2010).
　　When Nova suddenly collapsed in October of 2007, its branch schools had ballooned 
nationwide to an untenable number of 900, its advertising expenditures for television alone 
had substantially drained company assets, and despite the economic turmoil on the horizon, 
the company had just days-before completed a ¥70 million posh redecoration of its head 
offices (Takahara, 2007b).  The behavior left several economic researchers and critics to 
conclude that Nova management had simply lost all touch with reality and responsibility. 
Upon filing for bankruptcy, the company was the leading employer of foreign nationals in 
Japan, with approximately 5,000 on the payroll (Stubbings, 2007; Takahara, 2007a, 2007b). 
Many of these were left stranded when the company literally terminated nearly every job 
position overnight and without warning, subsequently withholding most employee salaries. 
It was also estimated that as many as 300,000 of its 420,000 students at the time would 
never recoup their prepaid tuitions (Kyodo, 2007), given that students were customers, from 
which companies filing for bankruptcy are protected.
　　As of the year 2013, whereas Geos had not returned to the market with any force, 
Nova was restructured under the name Nova Holdings Group, and reentered to become the 
third-largest eikaiwa provider in Japan.  Exercising a more cautious business model, under 
completely different management, the company embraced both the adult and especially 
the children’s market, as well as several diversified divisions in tutoring, translation, and 
publishing, a strategy that appeared to emulate its largest competitor, ECC.  In 2013, all 
of Nova Holdings claimed to be operating 336 schools, with about 66,000 students in 
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total (Budmar, 2013).  However, how much of this business was directly owned or merely 
affiliated under contract agreements is not clear.  As of January 2016, Nova claimed only 
365 regular employees despite a reported revenue of ¥7.8 billion (apx. $70 million U.S.) 
(Recruit, 2017b).
　　Given the continued inconsistent regulation of the private English industry in Japan, 
the history of labor transgressions by many language employers, and the history of Nova 
itself, the new Nova company could simply be hiring a considerable contract labor force and 
sidestepping a number of reporting and labor laws, thus mimicking the business practices 
of a successful midsized eikaiwa franchise known as Gaba Corporation (founded 1995) 
(Currie-Robinson, 2016).  As for Nova Holdings, in October 2016, the company claimed its 
eikaiwa division in Japan numbered 267 schools, and all of the Nova group had acquired or 
expanded to 1,733 branch schools globally.  Once again, it remains unclear as to how many 
of those schools were directly owned or merely affiliated, with the vast majority being small 
tutoring facilities in Japan for children, and operating under a variety of local or regional 
business names other than Nova (Nova, 2017).
Successful Commercial Course
　　Headquartered in the city of Osaka, ECC (Education through Communication for 
the Community) is known commercially as ECC Co., Ltd.  Founded in 1962, it is the 
oldest eikaiwa corporation in Japan. The company’s flagship division is advertised in the 
marketplace as the ECC Foreign Language Institute, a national chain of branch schools that 
focus on English language communication for adults and children.  The division is part of a 
larger holding, the ECC Group, which offers a variety of educational services.  These services 
include international study abroad programs, training for airline industry employees, and 
preparatory schooling for junior high school, high school, and college students.  
　　As of 2014, the ECC Group was reporting a total student base in Japan of 386,000 
(eikaiwa students and all others) (Recruit, 2014).  As of January 2017, the number was 
nearly 400,000, and the total employee base was more than 18,000 (ECC, 2017), though a 
2014 Recruit disclosure indicated that 4,500 were regular staff.  The ECC Foreign Language 
Institute itself, which offers primarily English courses to adults, is one part of the broader 
operation, with just over 400 native English teachers at more than 180 branch schools as 
of 2013-2014 (Budmar, 2013; Recruit, 2014).  These branch schools were concentrated 
strategically in the three most populated regions of the country, as opposed to spreading out 
to smaller cities and rural areas.  At the time of reporting, about two-thirds of the branches 
were divided evenly between the Kanto and Kansai regions, and many of the remaining 
branches were concentrated in Aichi Prefecture (the Nagoya area).  Reported annual sales 
were ¥41.3 billion ($375 million U.S.).
　　ECC was started in Osaka Prefecture as a small English conversation club, by 22-year-
old Isamu Yamaguchi (ECC, 2017).  Yamaguchi grew the company until it was registered 
as a corporation in January 1975, and remained as the company’s president throughout 
much of its evolution.  The current president, Katsumi Yamaguchi (2013), stated that the 
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business has always sought to “sell English conversation,” a point central to the company’s 
founding philosophy.  ECC developed around what Yamaguchi described as a student-needs 
approach, in which teachers played a supporting, facilitating role.  In this model, the label 
of student became synonymous with customer.  
　　The ECC model is important because it illustrates how the for-profit language academies 
developed their instructor-customer practices in Japan.  The model borrowed from the well-
established international private school Berlitz, as well as informed the way Berlitz itself 
would adjust for operations in Japan.  In the process of ECC running its for-profit business 
model, Yamaguchi (2013) claimed that the company tried to balance its efforts evenly 
between educational services and managerial efficiency.  In the larger history of language 
education, such focus represented a departure from running a non-profit or traditional 
public school, in which education and management functioned for the educational capacity 
exclusively.  In contrast, ECC changed language learning into a service industry, a model 
later emulated in varying degrees by Nova, Geos, and Aeon.
　　Consequently, as with any business set in a framework of providing service, customer 
satisfaction became part of the ECC learning program.  Unlike students in compulsory 
education, customers of language products were allowed choices, hence satisfaction became 
paramount to attracting new customers and retaining current ones.  The approach also 
required a new type of marketing scheme, involving what would become the industry’s 
primary asset: the foreign instructor (see Kubota, 2011, for sociological marketing analysis).
The Teacher-Seller Asset
　　The English communication industry boomed in the 1980s for several reasons, not 
the least of which included the Japanese bubble economy, which itself contributed to a 
growth in overseas study, commercial investment, and general cultural interest.  The boom 
also contributed to an organized, salaried contract system for foreign language instructors 
(Budmar, 2012).  In the process, the Big Four became the largest employers of Westerners 
in Japan, offering competitive compensation packages that schools and other learning 
institutions across most of Asia simply could not match.  With Continental Europe partial 
to English instructors from the U.K., and British Commonwealth locations in Asia, such as 
Hong Kong and Singapore, still inclined at the time toward British and Australian dialects (see 
Edwards, 2016, for recent shifts), the Big Four were able to attract mostly North American 
teachers, who offered a dialect that the Japanese market preferred.
　　Unlike the teacher in traditional models, who is trained in education to operate courses 
and present curriculum, the native-English conversation instructor became part of the 
customer satisfaction model, hence he or she became integral to the marketing strategy 
(Bailey, 2006).  In most eikaiwa businesses, historically and to the present, the foreign 
teachers were expected to sell new students and new courses, thus making these individuals 
not only instructors but also sales representatives.  Because students could select which 
school to contract lessons from, often based on their first-impression of a branch’s foreign 
instructor, the instructor was part of the commodity for sale.  This human product included 
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more than teaching ability, but also personality, physical appearance, and the ability to 
affectively relate to students (Bailey, 2006; Kramsch, 2010; Kubota, 2011).  As Takahashi 
(2013) argued, Western teachers were of particular marketing importance in attracting 
Japanese female student-customers, to which eikaiwa promotional material targeted gender 
stereotypes of passionate desire, social mobility, and identity transformation.  Consequently, 
as is common when hiring representatives across a variety of service and sales industries, 
the hiring bias was towards young, attractive, and energetic candidates, which in this case 
meant native speakers of particularly North American origin.
　　The bursting of the Japanese price asset bubble, in the early 1990s, did not seem to 
immediately affect the English conversation market throughout what has been termed 
Japan’s lost decade.  For teachers with only a bachelor’s degree and no special training in 
English education, contracts remained abundant and the salaries the highest in Asia (Budmar, 
2012).  Additionally, the Big Four corporate schools were known for reliable and honest 
teacher treatment, which was not always the case in other countries.  However, from the 
late-1990s onward, a combination of realities began to catch up with the lucrative English 
conversation market.  This combination included a continuing recession in the Japanese 
economy, changes in national labor laws, changes in national education policies, less money 
spent by Japanese students for English both domestically and abroad, and the growth of job 
markets internationally in countries such as China, South Korea, and Brazil.  When Nova 
collapsed in 2007, it also illustrated how the large English-conversation schools had fallen 
behind in teacher salaries, offering about ¥250,000 per month on average compared to a 
variety of other, developing options in Japan that averaged closer to ¥350,000 per month 
(Sidell & Jarvie, 2007).  The collective result was that many of the most sought-after teacher 
candidates started working elsewhere in Japan or in other countries.
　　As an example of changes in the teacher asset market, an anonymous source, at a mid-
level English provider for Japanese universities, explained that nearly 90% of its instructor 
workforce in the 1990s was from North America, with the average age around 25-30 
years.  By 2016, the numbers were closer to 40% for North Americans, and the average age 
closer to 30-35 years.  This is not to say that non-North Americans or older instructors are 
incapable delivering quality English education; on the contrary, the company has attracted 
numerous certified and experienced instructors, from many countries, to its academic 
teaching division.
　　However, the conversation industry on whole had built a public image on young faces, 
which were often depicted like actors or models, a strategy that helped generate substantial 
emotional spending by young student-customers, ones eager to indulge their akagore 
(Occidentalized longings) (Bailey, 2006) or pursue their quest for social inclusion (Kubota, 
2011).  Subsequently, the inability to provide the much sought-after product of American 
English, offered by instructors who seemed more like “cool” peers than educators, partially 
contributed to a loss of product sales and eventually the bankruptcies of the over-extended 
giants Nova and Geos, who had resorted to hiring almost anyone to fill their teacher 
contracts (see Budmar, 2012, & Currie-Robson, 2014, 2016, for survey of teaching in Japan; 
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see British Council, 2006, for report and predictions regarding English language teaching 
and markets globally during the decade of the 2000s).
A Cautious Track
　　Not to be confused with AEON & Seven Holdings, the Aeon Corporation (株式会社イー
オ ン) has remained the most fiscally conservative of the Big Four schools since its official 
inception in 1989.  Headquartered at an unassuming location in Okayama, Japan, operating 
in a manner far more reserved than even ECC, and nowhere as speculatively aggressive as 
either Nova or Geos, Aeon has avoided unnecessary bank financing, paid careful attention 
to economic indicators, and thus expanded and retreated in the eikaiwa market as needed. 
The company also maintains instructor recruitment offices only in North America, careful 
about the number of American instructors that might be in the market, and whether there 
will be enough to staff new branch openings in Japan.  The company’s flagship remains its 
adult eikaiwa Aeon brand, which has branch locations across the nation, from Okinawa to 
Hokkaido (Aeon, 2017a, 2017b).  The company’s second-largest division is Aeon Amity, 
which caters to children and adolescents, and accounts for about a quarter of branch 
locations nationally.  In 2004, the company also opened HAO Academy, a small division 
offering Chinese-language education at just a few metropolitan locations.  Imitating ECC’s 
model, Aeon has also developed other language-related and educational services, but on a 
modest scale that accounts for a small fraction of total revenue.
　　A great deal of Aeon’s direction and success is attributable to its founder, chairman, and 
CEO Kiyoshi Aki, known among his employees as health conscious and already at his desk 
in the morning before his staff arrives.  After Aki cofounded AMVIC in 1973 with Tsuneo 
Kusunoki, the business partners followed different entrepreneurial paths in 1989, when 
Kusunoki formed Geos and Aki developed Aeon.  The year represented the peak in Japan’s 
bubble economy, when the Nikkei stock average hit an all-time high and businesses were 
dumping money into all manner of new ventures, some of them legitimate, some incredibly 
speculative and destined for failure (see Meredith & Baumgartner, 1995, for IMF analysis). 
The Big Four, as well as numerous smaller academies, all prospered from this rapid and 
massive expansion, and customer interest clearly indicated that the English conversation 
market was a viable course for growth investment.
　　However, unlike Kusunoki and Geos, which set out to become an international brand 
on par with the global giant Berlitz Corporation, Aki and Aeon settled into offering English 
in Japan almost exclusively to Japanese adults and children.  Likewise, whereas Nova and 
Geos would become large corporations with expensive public profiles and impersonal board 
meetings, Aki employed a more traditional style of management, with a small loyal group 
of regional and district managers answerable directly to him, with Aki himself assuming 
regional manager duties over the second-largest of the company’s three regional districts 
(Aeon, 2017a).  As CEO and the controlling shareholder, Aki has retained full administrative 
control regarding nearly every aspect of total operations, from branch openings and closings, 
to poster advertising, to course textbook development.  In fact, in the first half of Aki’s (2017) 
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own succinct Message from the CEO, the chairman referred to educational research, method, 
and pedagogy, not business.
　　At first reading, Aki’s profile might seem incongruent with a successful corporate CEO. 
Fluent in English, schooled in American-style business and financing, and married to an 
American (Aki is father of Japanese-American singer-songwriter Angela Aki) (Poole, 2009), 
Aki has also remained entrepreneurially Japanese in approach, with almost no public photos 
anywhere on record, not even on Aeon’s website.  Given the cataclysms of Nova and Geos, 
and the realities of eikaiwa as a shrinking big-business commodity, the profile demonstrates 
a character perhaps wise to the potential pitfalls and untenable ambitions associated with 
the industry.  This not only allowed Aeon to survive and assume the position of second-
largest English language company in Japan, but has protected an estimated ¥30 billion ($270 
million U.S.) in total company assets as of the year 2016 (figure estimated from Recruit, 
2017a information and the accumulation trends for Aeon since 2010). 
　　From its first school in 1973, AMVIC eventually developed into AMVIC International, 
with two divisions operating towards slightly different purposes, one led by Kusunoki and 
the other by Aki.  In 1984, Aki’s division commanded 25 branch schools (Bailey, 2006). 
After the rapid bubble expansion, the business partners, in 1989, split AMVIC into two 
independent companies, when Aeon took on 149 branch schools.  At first, the number 
might seem large, but the schools themselves were mostly small shops in strategic locations, 
near train stations or adjacent to shopping centers.  By the year 1997, despite 230 branch 
schools, the company employed little more than 2,000 regular personnel, nearly a quarter 
of which were foreign nationals.  Relatedly, despite the growing number of regulations 
and labor laws concerning teacher hiring in Japan, Aeon has maintained one of the best 
reputations among General Union, the Japan-based trade union that deals with the private 
English education industry (St. Michel, 2015).  The company, along with ECC, is also 
commonly mentioned among teacher blogs and job sites as being one of the most reliable 
and professional private-sector schools to work for (e.g., Ash, 2017).
　　In terms of language course and material development, AMVIC, and subsequently Aeon, 
became dedicated to in-house textbook development beginning in 1976, and the company 
standardized its course levels and lessons throughout all of its adult schools by 1986 (Aeon, 
2017b).  These actions not only benefitted students, but in-house publishing kept textbook 
revenues within the company, and standardized lessons allowed for clear pricing guidelines 
for student-customers and sales representatives.  Unlike its competitors Nova and Geos, 
Aeon has also maintained the highest prices throughout its history, capturing substantial 
revenues from new and returning customers.  The company’s smaller enrollments, 
compared to those of its competitors in the Big Four, were set within small branch locations, 
thus allowing for closer personal contact with students, which in turn contributed to higher 
student satisfaction and renewable contracts.  
　　As of 2010, the year that Geos filed for bankruptcy protection, Aeon reported an annual 
revenue of over ¥24 billion (apx. $218 million U.S.), and held assets of more than ¥28 
billion ($255 million U.S.) (Aeon, 2010).  To maintain consumer confidence, the company 
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also began depositing 50% of prepaid student tuitions into a trust account managed by 
Mizuho Trust Bank, which would be held on behalf of students should Aeon suddenly cease 
operations or declare bankruptcy (Aeon, 2017b).  
　　As of December 2015, Aeon reported annual revenue of ¥19.3 billion ($175 million 
U.S.), which was consistent with the dwindling market and Aeon’s strategic reduction in 
size.  Despite peaking at over 400 branch locations sometime in the 2000s, Aeon scaled 
back to around 320 branches (240 for adults and 80 for children) while maintaining 100,000 
student-customers and protecting its total assets (Aeon, 2017b).  Compared to the Nova and 
Geos strategies, of measuring success by aggressively capturing market share and expanding 
student bases, a former employee of Aeon explained that the company, from branch 
managers to Chairman Aki, closely followed its bottom-line regarding revenue per student. 
From the 1990s onward, an Aeon marker seems to have been a fairly consistent pattern 
of trying to maintain about ¥200,000 per student, on average ($1,800 U.S.), and adjusting 
operational spending and branch openings and closings accordingly.  Data from the 2000s 
and 2010s revealed Aeon student-customer bases of 80,000 to 120,000, with total revenues 
between ¥15 billion to ¥26 billion, thus indicating an average revenue range of ¥187,000 to 
¥217,000 per student.
Summary
　　At its peak, the private English education industry generated about ¥200 billion per 
year, with the Big Four corporations of Nova, Geos, ECC, and Aeon capturing an estimated 
three-quarters or more of that market.  Two of these companies began in Osaka, and 
the other two started as one before dividing into separate ventures.  All four prospered 
dramatically from the Japanese bubble economy, but only two would carry on the spirit 
of that period, into aggressive expansion efforts that propelled both to the top spots in the 
industry, positions that were short-lived when both soon filed for bankruptcy, which wrecked 
faith in the market as a whole.  The other two corporations, one diversified and plodding, 
the other tightly managed and fiscally cautious, have been without major shock or setback in 
their respective histories, and still show considerable revenues.  The first of these two, ECC, 
is still growing, and assuming perhaps 70% of the market on its own as of 2016.  The largest 
of the two bankrupt brands, Nova, reentered the market under new ownership in 2012, but 
it remains too early to tell whether the venture will prosper or fall back into its old ways of 
cutting corners on the fast track to market expansion. 
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